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Summary  findings
Shah analyzes the typical model for regulating  Illustrating his conclusions with case studies from
investments in private pension funds. Pension reforms  Chile and Peru, Shah shows that these restrictions,
like those pioneered by Chile are being initiated or  though well-meant, are poorly justiried by financial
considered in Argentina, Bolivia, China, Colombia, Costa  theory, distort incentives for competition based on
Rica, Hungary,  Mexico, Peru, Uruguay, and elsewhere.  product choice and efficiency, increase administrative
Such reforms greatly improve fiscal discipline, make  costs, and seriously reduce the affiliates' appropriate risk-
social security benefits and burdens equitable, and  return choices and returns.
deepen financial markets. But they are also typically  And the resulting potential losses in retirement income
accompanied by:  are great.
* Tight restrictions on the investments in pension  Shah recommends a significant departure from the
fund portfolios.  Chilean-style model of a private pension fund system. He
* Restrictions on the management of mandated  briefly describes implementation and  transition issues for
retirement savings (to newly created legal entities called  the alternative system that he proposes, which would:
pension administrators, to the exclusion of such financial  - Permit diverse intermediaries-including  banks and
intermediaries as banks and mutual funds).  mutual funds that meet appropriate prudential
* Minimum-return  guarantees from the state and/or  standards-to  manage retirement  savings.
pension funds.  - Allow a greater choice between investment
* Commissions based on salary rather than on the  products.
volume of assets managed.  *  Require that returns be reported  on a net basis.
* Charge commissions as a fraction of assets managed.
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1. Introduction and Summary
In 1980, Chile passed the Decree Law 3500, partially replacing the state-run pay-
as-you-go (PAYG), unfunded social security system with individually capitalized
accounts in pension funds managed by private administrators.  The seminal reforms have
made a large contribution to Chile's economic performance since and inspired many
other countries to follow suit.  Similar reforns  have been initiated or are being actively
considered in Argentina, Colombia, Mexico, Peru, Bolivia, Costa Rica and Uruguay as
well as in China, Hungary, and elsewhere.  Annex I compares the basic features of the
social security reforms for Chile, Argentina, Colombia, Peru and Mexico.  While the
reforms vary from country to country in terms of whether the affiliation to the privately
managed funded system is voluntary or mandated, the level of contribution to the private
system, and the continuation of coverage under the public supplemental social security
systems; there are substantial similarities in the design and regulation of the private
pension funds.
The Chilean reforms have been greeted with widespread praise (Vittas and
Iglesias (1992)). They represented a decisive act on the part of a developing country to
recognize the dangers of unfunded and mushrooming social security obligations of the
government and discipline this process.  The pension fund assets have grown steadily and
accounted to over 40% of the GDP in 1995, while the annual savings of the system
amounted to 190¼  of national savings (Chilean Pension System).  The pension reforms
have made an important contribution to restoring equity in social security burdens and
benefits, improving fiscal discipline, the growth of equity and bond markets, savings
formation, and quite possibly to the remarkable economic performance of the Chilean
economy since the early eighties.
Mandatory retirement savings can provide substantial social security if they meet
three requirements: (i) an adequate level of contributions relative to salary, (ii) funding of
savings to avoid the principal-agent problems of the PAYG systems, and (iii) a
respectable level of real returs  on savings. Table 1 illustrates the typical calculus of
such systems.  With contributions of 10% of salary, workers joining the system at the
beginning of their working career will accumulate equivalent of 8-10 years of annual
retirement age salaries, which would suffice to pay replacement rates of one-half to two-
thirds of terminal salaries during retirement years.2
Table 1:  Wage Growth,  Investment  Returns,  and Replacement  Rates'
Annual Real  Annual Real  Retirement Acct.  Balance/  Replacement Rate
Wage  Retum on  Annual Salary at Retirement  with a 20-year
Growth (%)  Assets (%)  (years)  Annuity (%)
3  7  9.89  65
2  5  7.81  51
2  6  9.89  65
Note: ' Based  on the assumptions  that the affiliates  save 10%  of salary  over  40 working  years in a personal
retirement  account,  wages  and assets  grow  at above  rates, and at retirement  the account  balance  is converted
into a 20-year  annuity,  earning  3% real return. All contribution  and annuity  payments  are annual  and made
at the beginning  of the year.
Other things equal, low wage growth, high contribution rates, and high asset
returns would raise the value of retirement pensions.  The policy makers in developing
countries face important constraints in setting high contribution rates and transferring all
of the previous social security taxes into private pension funds. These limitations and the
likelihood that mandated personal retirement accounts will tend to dominate financial
investments and quite possibly all personal wealth, underscore the importance of
optimizing the efficiency of investments.  This paper analyzes the typical investment-
related regulation, its effect on long term return optimization, and  attempts to identify
possible improvements.
As private pension systems are typically defined contribution plans and the
affiliates assume most of the investment risks, we take the affiliate's perspective, and
investigate possibilities for improving the affiliate's risk-return tradeoff, considering the
career-long investment horizons.  To do so, we examine the effect of investment
regulations on the portfolio composition of pension funds and thus the aggregate return,
the appropriateness of the portfolio for the affiliate, the degree of competition and
efficiency in managing pension assets, and the costs of investment management services.
Again applying the perspective of the affiliate, we examine these issues against the
standards of efficiency of intermediation, choice of investments, and degree of prudential
regulation implicit in regulation of voluntary savings management.
Chilean-style mandated private pension systems are hybrids incorporating
elements both of a state-directed system and private savings management.  They relate
benefits to savings, actually invest the savings, permit private managers to manage funds,
and offer the affiliates choice of managers.  These are substantial improvements over
actuarially bankrupt, underfunded, or highly unequal PAYG systems.  Yet, investment
regulations merely seeking to improve upon PAYG systems may well set low standards
of performance for private managers.  The mandated savings accrue over long periods,
into a large fortune. During this process, the affiliates bear significant investment risks
and undergo considerable changes in their risk taking capacity. Thus their welfare would
depend on the appropriateness of investments to their varied situations, the level of
competition between investment managers, and their incentives to attain cost efficiencies
and share the resulting gains with the investors.3
In Chile and elsewhere,  the regulations  create a new intermediary  (the pension
fund administrator),  a new regulator  to license  and oversee  them, and a rather special
regulatory  structure. The administrators  face extensive  restrictions  on investments.  They
must guarantee  a return within a certain  band of the average  return of the industry,  if
needed,  through  their personal  resources.  The administrators  can offer only one fund , the
affiliate  can invest  in only one fund. Existing  banks,  mutual  funds, or insurance
companies  cannot  manage  mandated  savings. Transfers  between  different  pension  funds
are somewhat  restricted  with minimum  stay  periods and transfer  fees. The fund
administrators  can charge  fees as a percentage  of salary  (which  is typical)  and of the
assets managed,  as well  as flat transaction  fees for deposit,  withdrawal,  account
statement,  etc..
How well do these  regulations  serve  the affiliates? We find that the net returns to
the affiliates  in rnost  countries  are negative  or negligible  over the first 4-5 years,  and do
not beat returns  from simple  investments  such as bank CDs,  over the long haul. The
regulation  seems  to create  profound  biases against  competition,  efficiency,  specialization,
or and in favor of excessive  direct  marketing  expenses. The resulting  losses, even  if
small,  can seriously  endanger  the retirement  nest egg, while subjecting  the affiliates  to
inappropriate  risk-reward  tradeoffs  in the interim.
We attribute  these problems  to well-meaning  but counterproductive  investment
regulation. First, the direct  investment  restrictions  on portfolio  decisions  of pension  fund
managers  cannot  be easily derived  from disciplined  models  of financial  economics. They
seem  to limit investment  universe  considerably,  result in poor portfolio  decisions  for long
term disciplined  savings,  and generally  poor risk-reward  tradeoffs. Second,  the Chinese
walls around  the pension  fund industry  protects  the fund managers  from competition
from other financial  intermediaries  and products,  encourages  larger marketing  and set-up
costs, and denies  the affiliates  investment  vehicles  better  suited  to their needs. While
designed  to protect the affiliates,  guaranteed  return  within certain  bands actually
encourage  investment  in identical  portfolios,  thus eliminating  specialization  in investment
management.  Finally,  the commission  structure  and reporting  of gross  rather  than net
returns  allows  exaggeration  of true returns,  making  comparison  of performnance  with the
mutual  funds and others  difficult.
These  difficulties  and the need for a better  investment  regime  are beginning  to be
recognized,  particularly  in Chile and Peru. Yet, the dominant  influence  of the Chilean
design,  the complexity  of social security  reforms,  and the need for legislative  actions  to
fix several  problems  result  in rather slow  curative  action  among  the older reformers  while
the same  design  flaws are replicated  elsewhere. We propose  an alternate  model  based on
2  In Mexico, the law envisages creation of two funds -- an equity-oriented fund and a fixed
income fund by each administrator, though the regulation initially permits only investment in the latter
initially.  In Chile and Argentina, the administrators operate only one fund but additional deposits of
voluntary savings are permitted.4
personal retirement accounts.  The basic intuition of such design is that while mandated
savings originate differently from voluntary savings, in defined contribution plans, their
investment does not call for a fundamentally different financial industry.  Participation by
existing financial intermediaries would further the cause of social security, by injecting
greater investment choice, competition, marketing approaches, and cost efficiency. We
examine some of the political, equity oriented, and technical arguments for favoring the
traditional Chilean-style model (hereafter, referred to as "AFP model") and find that they
are largely refutable and that the proposed alternative should be seriously considered.
The paper is organized as follows.  The second section briefly describes the
Chilean and Peruvian pension fund systems and selectively examines their investment
performance.  Section 3 discusses the regulators' difficulties in prescribing meaningful
investment restrictions in a simple Markowitz framework for optimum portfolio
selection, and argues for substantial relaxation of investment constraints.  Section 4
discusses regulatory incentives for competition, or the lack thereof, in the typical Latin
American social security reforms.  Section 5 discusses the typical commission structure
and its effects on costs, competition and efficiency.  Section 6 discusses the potential
losses of social security arising from long term efficiency losses from inadequate
competition.  Section 7 discusses the alternative approach based on Personal Retirement
Accounts.  Section 8 deals with some of the implementation and transition issues and
criticisms of the alternative. The final section summarizes conclusions and
recommendations.
2.  Performance of Chilean and Peruvian Systems
The Case of Chile
Background.  In September 1996, the Chilean pension system consisted of 15
Administradores de Pensiones (AFPs) 3. The system started in 1981. The number of
AFPs reached a peak of 21 in early 1990s and has been falling since. Participation is
mandatory for all employed workers and voluntary for the self-employed.  The workers
received recognition bonds in lieu of their accumulated contributions and benefits under
the state-run PAYG system, but otherwise the state-owned system is terminated. By
1995, the system had 5.3 million affiliates and 3.0 million contributors (the rest being
retirees, irregular self-employed contributors, unemployed, and workers whose payments
are delayed).  Each AFP can manage only one account, and each worker can maintain
only one account with an AFP. Account transfers are restricted to three per year, and
there was a bill pending in Congress in December 1996 proposes to restrict them to once
a year.  Since August 1987, AFPs have been also allowed to accept deposits of voluntary
saving in the so called second accounts, which are also invested in the same portfolio, but
3  This  section  is largely  based on "The Chilean  Pension  System",  second  edition,  by the
Superintendency  of the Pension  Funds  Administrators.5
can be withdrawn prior to retirement.  A substantially different tax regime applies to
voluntary savings.
Minimum  Return Guarantee from the AFP.  Each month, each AFP must
ensure a minimum return equal to the lower of average return of all AFPs for the last 12
months minus 2%, or 50% of the average industry-wide return.  Returns in excess of
150% of industry average or the industry average plus 2% can,  be placed in a Yield
Fluctuation Reserve.  In addition, the AFP must create a Cash Reserve equal to 1% of
assets managed.  These reserves, in that order -- and if they are insufficient, private
resources of the AFP -- must make good any shortfalls below the minimum.
Investments.  Investments in pension funds are tightly controlled (see Vittas and
Iglesias for an extensive discussion).  In particular, equity investments were not permnitted
until 1985, were limited to 30% of the fund's assets over 1985-95 and since 1995 are
limited to 37%.  The law and regulations prescribe maximum limits on different classes
of instrument, rating requirements for most interest-bearing securities, limits on
maximum holding of securities of one issuer, limits on individual issue of any instrument,
limits in terms of the share of the capital of the issuer in the sector and limits in terms of
share of the pension fund in total pension fund assets.  In addition, investment in
individual securities such as equities must be weighted by liquidity factors and
concentration factors.  While the limits have been gradually revised upwards, the
structure still contains many more rules than necessary for simply achieving
diversification.  In addition, new classes of assets cannot be added by pension funds as
they become available, and must await approval by the Superintendent.
The requirement of ensuring minimum returns relative to the industry average
strongly induce the AFPs to invest in identical portfolios, as can be seen in Table 2.  As
the contributions are mandated, the affiliates cannot influence portfolio composition by
voting with their feet.
Table 2: Absence  of Diversification  of Investments  Across
Chilean  Pension  Funds
Government  Mortgage  Bank  Corporate
Bonds  Credit  Bills  Instruments'  Equity  Bonds
Average  of All Funds  39.41%  16.79%  5.32%  29.37%  5.11%
Standard  Deviation  4.33%  3.87%  2.91%  1.61%  1.70%
Variability  Coefficient  0.110  0.230  0.547  0.055  0.333
Notes:  'Term  Deposits  and  Promissory  Notes  issued  by  financial  institutions.
Source:  The Chilean Pension System.
Commissions.  There are no limits on the level of commissions.  Initially, the
AFPs were free to charge fixed and variable commissions based on salaries and account
balances, as well on commissions for each deposit, withdrawal, etc..  Fixed and variable
commissions based on balances have been abolished since 1987. Aggregate
commissions, including insurance costs, increased from 5.1% of average taxable salary in6
1982  to 8..27%  in 1983  and 8.69%  in 1984,  fell gradually  to around  3.1% of salary  by
1990,  and have  been stagnant  since.
Performance  of the Funds. Table  3 shows  the average  income  of all
contributing  salaried  and self-employed  affiliates,  their average  gross  commissions,  net
commissions  after deducting  expenses  of death and disability  insurance,  real returns (only
real  returns are relevant  and available  given  pervasive  indexation  of financial  and other
contracts  in Chile)  on investments,  and the internal  rate of return on pension  fund for an
affiliate  that participated  in the system  from 1982 onwards,  based  on both the amounts
credited  to his/her  individual  account  as well as the commissions  paid to the AFPs, but
ignoring  death and disability  premia.
Table 3:  Chilean  Pension Fund Returns  Net of Commissions
Annual  Gross  Net  Pension
Monthly  Contribution Commission Commission  Contribution  Fund Real  Year End  Annual
Income  @ 10% of  % of avg.  % of avg.  Commission  and Net  Returns  Assets  IRR
Ch$'  income'  income  income  Ch$'  Commission'  without Fees 2 Managed'  to date 3
1982  117221  140665  5.10%  3.31%  46560  187225  28.8%  18117  -3.2%
1983  98995  118794  8.27%  5.50%  65337  184131  21.3%  363865  -1.3%
1984  93974X  112769  8.69%  6.38%  71946  184715  3.5%  493316  -5.9%
1985  122197  146636  6.68%  4.43%  64960  211596  13.4%  725705  -2.3%
1986  122910  147492  6.05%  3.89%  57374  204866  12.3%  980601  0.3%
1987  117679  141215  5.49%  3.42%  48295  189510  5.4%  1182394  0.5%
1988  113357  136028  4.00%  2.09%  28430  164458  6.4%  1402801  1.4%
1989  137616  165139  3.55%  1.85%  30551  195690  6.9%  1676128  2.1%
1990  141237  169484  3.15%  1.93%  32710  202195  15.5%  2131682  4.2%
1991  151718  182062  3.10%  2.06%  37505  219566  29.7%  3000926  7.9%
1992  163315  195978  3.07%  2.13%  41743  237721  3.1%  3296008  6.9%
.1993  175279  210335  3.07%  2.28%  47956  258291  16.2%  4074370  8.0%
1994  199972  239966  3.05%  2.28%  54712  294679  18.2%  5099546  9.1%
1995  204575  245490  3.06%  2.36%  57936  303426  -2.5%  5211410  7.4%
Simple average =  12.7%
Notes: ' Amounts are in December 1995 Chilean Pesos.
2Real  returns on investible assets for each year without adjustment for fees and commissions.
3Internal  Rate of Return reflects the IRR up to the corresponding year.
Source: Superintendent of Pension Fund Administrators, June 1996; D. Vittas, A. Iglesias, WPS 867, February 1992.
Table 3 shows  that the Chilean  AFPs earned  an average  annual  return  of 12.7%
during 1982-95,  and the average  return  in the first five years  was a spectacular  15.9%.
But factoring  in the commissions  charged  by the AFPs into this calculation,  the internal
rate of returnfor the affiliates  was negative  for the first four years  and barely  0.3% p.a.
after five years. Thus an affiliate  who  joined the system  in 1982 virtually  failed  to earn
any returns on her investments  for five years,  despite  rather spectacular  gains  on her
investment  portfolio! The results  are rather similar  when  comparisons  are made for
different  years  as can be seen from Table  4. Over 1982-95,  the net real return for the
average  affiliate  was still high at 7.4%  p.a., but substantially  lower  than the 12.7%  p.a.7
average real return on investments.  Thus, expenses of the AFPs have consumed an
average 5.3 percentage points. of the assets managed.
Table  4: Internal  Rates  of Returns v. Average  Real Pension  Fund  Returns
under  Selected  Investment  Horizons
Affiliate  Joined  in 1982  Affiliate  Joined  in 1986  Affiliate  Joined  in 1991
Avg.  of  Avg.  of  Avg.  of
IRR'  Real  Fund  IRRi  Real  Fund  IRR 1 Real  Fund
to date  Returns 2 to date  Returns 2 to date  Returns 2
After5 Years  0.3%  15.9%  1.6%  9.3%  2.1%  12.9%
After  l0Years  7.9%  14.3%  6.6%  11.1%
After 14  Years  7.4%  12.7%
Note:  '  Returns  reflect the IRR  up to the corresponding  year.
2  Annual  average  of  the  Real  Pension  Fund  returns  without  the  effect  of fees  or
commissions  for  the  corresponding  time  period.
Source:  Superintendent  of Pension  Fund  Administrators,  June  1996;  D. Vittas,  A. Iglesias,
WPS867,  February  1992.
Clearly, as a form of financial intermediation, privatized pension systems seems
rather expensive not only in the initial period of affiliation, but also over the entire 14
year period. The implications of this are particularly disturbing for other countries, since
the performance of the Chilean economy has been exceptional during this period.  Other
countries such as Argentina, Peru and Colombia who are encouraging, rather than forcing
as in Chile, participation in the privatized system will undoubtedly face greater
challenges in convincing the workers to join the privatized system if their capital seems
to erode rather than grow in the initial period.
Costs and Efficiency.  While the average cost for a contributing affiliate over
1982-95 seems rather high based on available data, it may be somewhat overstated for
several reasons.  The average cost data published by the Superintendency are highly
processed, and some experts have suggested possibilities of errors (which were raised
with but not confirmed or denied by the Superintendency).  Also, while above costs are
correctly interpreted for contributors, contributors subsidize non-contributing affiliates to
the extent no fees are charged on balances maintained, as is the case in Chile since 1987.
However, during 1982-86, the AFPs did charge fixed and variable fees based on the
balance as well as on new contributions; thus, during this period, such distortions are
relatively smaller.  Also, the self-employed who contribute more irregularly than the
salaried affiliates, and the holders of voluntary savings accounts (some 961,000 who hold
only 1.3% of total funds) who don't pay any commissions "free ride" compared to the
regular affiliates. Pension funds also pay retirement, death and disability pensions, but
they charge a separate commission for this.  Pension recipients have grown from zero at
the initiation of the system to 289,452, still only 5.5% of the affiliates.
AFPs incur some expenses in following up missing or misapplied payments.
Such costs cannot be isolated from available system-wide data, but perhaps are not an
important factor.  Collection problems, presumably worse in the earlier periods, do not8
appear to be a major problem now.  Aggregate uncollected payments (including those
where the employer admits obligations but has not been able to pay, where the amount
reported as paid exceeds actual payment (due to clerical errors), and amounts unreported
and estimated to be unpaid by the AFPs) amounted to 2.5% of the value of the funds in
1990 and fell to 1.1% by 1995. A sample study by the AFP industry in 1990 estimated
the causes of non-payment as temporary or permanent, voluntary or forced
unemployment (in 41.5% of cases) and self-employed with no income statement (36.5%)
for whom participation is voluntary.  Of the remaining 22%, only 4% did not contribute
on account of employer delays.
While the above factors suggest much caution in inferring efficiency from average
costs and the need for further analysis of disaggregated cost data, there is much more
direct evidence and literature acknowledging that collectively AFPs have incurred rather
large set-up and direct marketing costs, and passed them on to their clients.  It also seems
clear that regulation has permitted and indeed contributed to such a strategy by mandating
savings (which deny the possibility of clients withdrawing savings from inefficient
intermediaries) and limiting competition from existing intermediaries who would have
smaller set-up costs and presumably a different marketing orientation.  For instance,
according to the Chilean Superintendent of Pension Fund Administrators, 4
"from 1982  to 1983,  AFPs  significantly  increased  percent  commissions  on the balance  and
imposable  (taxable)  income,  as a means  of reverting  the 1981-82  negative  operating  result
which  stemmed  from  heavy start up costs".
Amortization of start-up costs amounted to over 13% of total operating costs in 1983 and
1984. Indeed, during 1983 and 1984, most affiliates paid more than an entire month's
salary in pension fund  commissions and insurance costs.
From the beginning, pension funds have employed marketing tactics normal to
selling long dated endowment type insurance policies, relying on direct personal
marketing using salespersons, rather than indirect marketing typical of banks or mutual
funds. Direct marketing expenses and sales staff costs amounted to about a quarter of the
total administrative costs per contributor in 1983, and 21.9% in 1984. In March 1982, the
affiliates were restricted to a minimum period of three months with an AFP, which was
increased to four months in November 1982. In addition, the affiliates were required to
confirm the transfer to a special AFP agency.  However, the sales and marketing costs fell
only marginally to around 20% of the total by 1987. When the latter requirement was
dropped in March 1988, these costs started rising dramatically reaching 37% of the total
in 1994. In 1995, these costs fell to 32% of the total, but still rose 9% in real terms.  As a
result of this increasing marketing costs, the
"downward  trend in previsional  costs became  almost  imperceptible  starting  in 1990,  when
commercial  costs began  escalating. This  occurred  despite  the increase  in contributors'  real
4  The  Chilean  Pension  System,  June 1996.9
income  (44.8%  between 1990  and 1995). As a matter  of fact, from 1990  to 1995  this cost
stagnated  at 3.1%  of imposable  income,  whereas  in  monetary  terms  they increased  by 40.4%."
Simultaneously, the number of transfers increased from 306,819 in 1988 to over
1.3 million in 1  995.  As the participation in the system is mandatory for all but the self-
employed, most of the marketing expense is targeted towards stealing clients from other
AFPs.  For example, during December 1995, 11051 new workers, both salaried and self-
employed, joined the system, whereas 113,945 affiliates transferred from one AFP to
another during the same month. The transfers amounted to 25% of all affiliates in 1995
while the attempts to transfer amounted to about 37% of the total.  The sales force of the
AFPs amounted to 15,432 agents in 1995, implying that each agent was responsible for
bringing only 8.1 accounts per month, and less than one of which is a new entrant to labor
market.  The switches are engineered through high pressure, or even unethical, direct
marketing and bribes.  Offering rebates of sales commissions, or gifts of pens,
calculators, telephones, etc. are common practices.  Of the 22,000 agents registered with
the Superintendency, as many as 5,000 have been delicenced as sales agents for forging
signatures of affiliates on transfer forms or lesser offenses such as providing misleading
information.  Delisted agents can be, and often are, employed in other parts of the AFPs.
Vigorous competition between AFPs for clients based on net return performance,
suitability of investment product, and service would certainly be desirable.  However,
service standards are largely regulated. And investments and thus returns are largely
indistinguishable.  Thus AFPs compete primarily by outspending each other on direct
marketing designed to switch clients from other AFPs.  The Chilean Pension System (p.
82) observes that the three causes of the intensity of competition are the large number of
AFPs, the difficulty of the AFPs to differentiate the product-service they provide, and the
limited potential of expanding through new affiliates versus transfers.  It also observes (p.
83) that the affiliates have "no possibility of exerting group pressure on the AFP in order
to achieve favorable conditions, such as, for example, a reduction in costs".
A different  -- more  inclusive  -- system  design,  permitting  different  types  of
existing financial intermediaries (such as banks or mutual funds who rely on indirect
marketing) ancl  greater diversity of investment products would have material influence on
the set-up and marketing expenses, which have accounted from a 25-37% of the total.  In
particular, the AFP account structure seems over-engineered and expensive for most low
income or new affiliates. As of December 1995, over 35% of the 5.4 million affiliates had
less than $500 in their accounts, and over half had under $1228 (500,000 Chilean pesos)
in their accounts.  Many of these accounts seem too small to be inexpensively managed
by pension funds, and would form natural clients for banks.  Table 5 provides some idea
of the returns from alternative investments had these been permitted.  For example, the
average return on CDs was about 8.2% p.a. over 1982-86, compared to 0.3% p.a. in the
average AFP account.  Even if the banks charge fees or require minimum balances, it is
Ibid.10
unlikely that these will prevent affiliates saving 13-14% a month regularly without a bank
account or with practically zero return over five years.  Banks have some natural
advantages -- existing banking relationships with employers/affiliates, participation in the
payment system, a tradition of low or no fee accounts, and indirect marketing -- in
handling high frequency, low balance accounts.  (Actually, monthly deposits/payments
would hardly constitute high frequency for banks.)  Existing mutual fund and bank
products would also spare the affiliates many of the set-up costs.  The Table also shows
the very high average real returns and volatility from investing in Chilean stocks, that
may have been appropriate investment strategies for certain affiliates.
Table 5:  Comparison  of Performance  of Financial
Instruments  in Chile
90-365 CD  Fixed Income  IFCG Total  Pension Fund  Annual IRR
Real Rate  Real IRR  US$ Index  Returns  to date
(a)  (b)  (c)  (d)  (e)
1982  12.4%  -54.6%  28.8%  -3.2%
1983  7.9%  9.6%  -31.5%  21.3%  -1.3%
1984  8.4%  8.0%  -23.7%  3.5%  -5.9%
1985  8.2%  8.7%  49.3%  13.4%  -2.3%
1986  4.1%  5.1%  154.8%  12.3%  0.3%
1987  4.3%  6.0%  30.2%  5.4%  0.5%
1988  4.6%  5.8%  37.1%  6.4%  1.4%
1989  6.8%  7.7%  51.2%  6.9%  2.1%
1990  9.4%  7.3%  40.4%  15.5%  4.2%
1991  5.4%  5.8%  98.1%  29.7%  7.9%
1992  5.3%  7.6%  16.2%  3.1%  6.9%
1993  6.4%  6.6%  34.6%  16.2%  8.0%
1994  6.4%  6.1%  45.0%  18.2%  9.1%
1995  5.9%  6.9%  0.6%  -2.5%  7.4%
AvgafterSyears(f)  8.2%  7.9%  18.1%  15.9%  0.3%
Avg after 10 years (f)  7.1%  7.1%  35.1%  14.3%  7.9%
Avg after 14 years(f)  6.8%  7.0%  30.4%  12.7%  7.4%
(a)  Interest rates for 90-365 day deposits; deflated  by the UF (Unidad de Fomento-the
economic  index that reflects inflation  variations according  to the CPI (IPC)).
(b)  Real annual average intemal rate of return for fixed income instruments  traded on the
Chilean stock exchange.
(c)  IFC Global Index; From 1994 forward, Index constitutes  60% to 75% of the total
capitalization  of the local stock exchange. This index takes into account  the effect of
dividend  reinvestment.
(d)  Real pension fund index without adjustments  for fees and commissions.
(e) Annual Intemal  Rate of Retum reflects the IRR up to the corresponding  year.
(f)  Simple average is taken for the CD rate (a); Fixed Income Real IRR (b); IFCG Total (c);
and Pension  Fund Retums (d).  IRR returns reflect  average returns for an affiliate over
the period 1982-1995.
Sources: Bolsa Comercio de Santiago; IFC Emerging Markets  Database; "Informe
Econ6mico  y Financiero," Banco Central de Chile.11
If the regulators permitted banks and mutual funds to manage mandated savings
accounts, most low income and new affiliates would probably start with a more familiar
bank accounts, and slowly graduate to mutual/pension funds as their balance grew.  In
December 1995, about 1.14 million affiliates, over a quarter of the total, had balances
exceeding $5,000, and about 463,000 of these had balances of more than $12,000. Thus,
mutual and pension funds would also have a natural clientele -- more affluent, more
sophisticated, and demanding better investment products.  In such a scenario, pension
funds could form, but would face greater constraints in passing on large marketing or set-
up costs to the clients, if mutual funds are competing on the basis of low cost and high
return pass-through.
A more thorough comparison based on the history of typical transaction charges
of the banks, mutual funds, and pension funds would certainly help regulators assess such
choices better.  But it is worth emphasizing that the mandated retirement savings (which
in Chile were $27.7 billion, over 45% of GDP in July 1996) of the order 13-15% of the
payroll are not marginal flows.  Permitting all financial intermediaries to share this
lucrative pie will improve incentives to offer appropriate products, economies of scale,
the bargaining power of the affiliates, and cost consciousness among all intermediaries.
The Case of Peru
Recent History.  Peru was the second country in Latin America to undertake
major social security reforms.  Evaluation of social security reform options began in
earnest in 1990 and in 1992, an option to the national PAYG system was created. Private
pension funds commenced operations in July 1993. Unlike Chile, the participation in the
private system is voluntary.  Eight Administradores de Fondos de Pensiones (AFPs) were
formed initially; three have since closed with large losses and were merged or taken over
by the survivors. Affiliation to the private system was slow until 1995 due to a weak
information campaign, some delays in issuance of recognition bonds, lower contribution
rates for the public system than in the private system, and the failure to close the public
system to new entrants to labor pool.  The contribution rates between the public and
private systems were equalized in July 1995 and the rates for public system are expected
to become higher to discourage continued participation in the public system in 1997. In
1996, affiliation has increased significantly, to over 50,000 affiliates per month, with
increasing awareness of the problems of the public pension system and public measures
to encourage a transfer.  As of  September 1996, some 1.4 million Peruvian workers were
affiliated with private AFPs, with a roughly similar number remaining in the public
system.  The total assets managed approached $900 million in September 1996.
Regulation.  The Peruvian regulation is very similar to that of Chile.  Only AFPs
created under the new laws are entitled to manage mandated retirement savings.  Each
AFP manages a single portfolio and each affiliate is entitled to one account only.  As in
Chile, each AFP must ensure returns within a band of 50-150% of industry average
returns, with the excess over 150% being reserved and shortfalls below 50% covered12
from the excess reserves or the AFP.  A new Superintendent of Pension Funds was
formed.  Investment guidelines are fairly strict, with equity investments being restricted
to effectively 10% of the fund assets initially and 20% since December 1995 . The
commissions are not restricted.  Typically, the AFPs charge fixed monthly commissions
plus a variable commission based on salary.  The latter has typically been of the order of
2-2.3% of salary. Until November 1995, the SAFP did not permit transfers between
AFPs. It now requires a minimum contribution period of six months and a fee of  soles
40 to transfer to another AFP.
Investment Portfolio.  As in Chile, return guarantees relative to industry average
have caused AFPs to invest in virtually identical portfolios, not only in terms of broad
allocation between stocks, bonds, etc. but also in individual security holdings.  The
Superintendent of AFPs (SAFP) generates exhaustive data on individual funds' portfolios
and the AFPs regularly monitor and mimic each other's  portfolio.  This is reflected in
increasing convergence of values of AFP stocks.  The variation [(Max-Min)/Average] in
AFP share values was 8.1% in 1993, 6.4% in 1994, 4.3% in 1995, and 5.3% in September
1996. The portfolio is apparently unsuitable to the needs of the young affiliates.  More
than half the affiliates are less than 30 years old, over two-thirds are less than 35, and less
than 10% are over 45.  Yet over half the AFP investments are in bank CDs, and bonds of
financial institutions.  Some AFP managers confess that the return bands not only reduce
the incentives to compete on the basis of product differentiation, specialization, or
efficiencies of scale, but they find some comfort in this arrangement as it avoids
likelihood of under-performance 7. Following a review of the social security system
under a World Bank project, in November 1996 Peruvian authorities planned to issue new
regulations to drop the minimum return guarantee.
Performance of AFP System. AFPs and SAFP statistics used to publicize high
realized rates of return, ranging from 6-8% p.a. in real terms.  The returns were, however,
computed before commissions.  Thus most affiliates may not have been fully aware of the
effective return on their savings. As part of the World Bank project referred to above,
there are plans now to require AFPs to report return statistics net of expenses.  Table 6
summarizes the performance of Peruvian AFPs.  It shows the aggregate contributions in
the individual accounts, total commissions, year-end account balances, and annual
internal rates of return after taking into account commissions, for the period August 1993
to September 1996.  It shows that Peruvian affiliates realized negative returns, net of
6  This limit  applies  to common  shares  with  voting  rights. In addition,  funds  are allowed  to
invest  a similar  amount  in the so called  "labor"  shares  issued  by many Peruvian  companies.  These are
non-voting  shares,  accounting  for about 10%  of the total  stock market  capitalization,  and are rather
illiquid. By and large,  the pension  funds are unable  to invest significant  amounts  in these  shares. There
was a proposal  by the securities  regulator  to eliminate  these  labor shares  either  by payout  or conversion
into straight  equity  or other  instruments,  and a separate  proposal  by the Superintendency  of the AFPs  to
combine  these limits  and permit  investment  of 35% of the funds' assets  in equity  in September  1996.
While  investment  managers  interviewed  would  not discuss  their compensation  in detail,  it
appears  to be partly  based  on relative  returns..13
expenses,  in the first two years, and  returns of 4.46%  p.a. by the third year. Compared  to
inflation  of 15-20%  p.a. during  this period,  returns were significantly  negative  in real
terms.
Table 6:  Pension Fund Returns in Peru
(in thousands of new soles)
Annual  Annual  Year-End  Annual
Annual  Commissions  Outflows of  Cumulative  Assets  Internal Rate
Year'  Contribution  Collected  Affiliate  Contribution  Managed  of Return 2
1994  382939  47924  430863  430863  430236  -0.32%
1995  _  610398  1  122872  733270  1164133  1154906  -0.92%
1996  751649  204808  956457  2120590  2241167  4.46%
Notes:  ' Months covered for year 1994 are August 1993- September 1994; October-September
for years 1995 and 1996.
2 IRR is calculated using the monthly flow through the end of the corresponding period.
Sources: Superintendency of Pension Fund Administrators, Peru.
Table 7 compares  the returns on investment  in CDs and Peruvian stock  market
versus the gross  and net returns from pension  funds, and is indicative  of the opportunity
costs of not being able  to invest more flexibly. For example,  an affiliate  able  to invest  in
bank CDs at the average  rates  reported  below,  without  paying  the typical  AFP fees,
would  have obtained  average  returns  of around 15-17%  p.a., compared  to 4.5% p.a.
earned  in pension  fimds.
Table 7:  Performance  of Financial  Instruments  in Peru
IFCG Total  Gross  Net
180-365 CD  Local Currency  Pension  Pension
Year  Rate  Index  Fund IRR  Fund IRR
(a)  (b)  (c)  (d)  (e)
1994  16.9%  80.4%  27.8%  -0.3%
1995  17.2%  55.7%  18.0%  -0.9%
1996  15.0%  17.3%  20.3%  4.5%
(a) Months covered for 1994 are Aug 93- Sep 94; Oct-Sep for years 1995 and 1996.
(b) Interest rates for 180-360 day deposits for September of indicated year.  1996
figure is for August.
(c) IFC Global Index in local currency with dividends reinvested.  Annual change in
index December to December figure for the preceding year.
(d) Annual internal rate of return through the corresponding date without
considering fees and commissions.
(e) Annual internal rate of return through the corresponding date considering fees
and commissions.
Sources:  IFC Emerging  Markets  Database;  Peruvian  Superintendencia  de
Admninistradoras  Privadas de Fondos de Pensiones.
Marketing  Expenses.  Analysis of the financial results of the system and
individual AFPs reveal the same pronounced pattern of marketing expenses.  The direct14
marketing  expenses  amounted  to over half the total expenses  and over 60% of total
commissions  in 1995  and 1996. AFPs employ  some  4,600 salespersons  ("promoters'),
who generate  an average  of 8-IO  customers  each month through  door to door  canvassing.
There  is little effort at informing  or marketing  through  mass media and or collaborative
advertising. The marketing  strategy  focuses  on inducing  transfers  from other  AFPs of
affiliates  who have  already  joined the privatized  system,  rather than from the national
PAYG  system. AFPs pay promoters  a commission  stating from 3.5% up to 16%  of
monthly salary. At the higher  end, it would  take an AFP over eight months  of affiliation
to recover  just the direct  sales commission. If the affiliate  transfers  to another  AFP after
the minimum  six months,  the former  AFP would  not even  recover  the promoter's
commission.
Despite  the large  costs paid by the affiliates,  and  the significant  increase  in
volume  of assets managed,  to nearly  $900  million,  each AFP is losing  money. As of July
1996,  they had accumulated  losses  of over $82  million,  or about two-thirds  of their
originally  paid-in  capital. In addition,  they  had deferred  expenses  of about $48 million,
or 57% of their reported  assets. If these were written  off, the AFPs would  be operating
with nearly  zero  or negative  capital. AFPs apparently  monitor  the capital  and financial
situation  of each  other, hoping  to take over others  and prevent  being taken over. Their
accumulated  losses indicate  future pressures  to raise commissions.
In Peru, the authorities  have implemented  significant  improvements  in the
regulatory  regime. In November  1995,  they  eliminated  the return  bands,  substantially
relaxed investment  guidelines,  and now require  reporting  of net returns. Whether  these
changes  motivate  the AFPs to invest in varied  portfolios  and reduce  their reliance  on
direct  marketing  remains  to be seen.
The experience  of Chile and Peru  are not unique. Similar  tendencies  towards  high
set up expenses,  focus on door  to door marketing  and other  high pressure sales  tactics,
and effectively  high commissions,  are discernible  in other  countries,  such  as Argentina
and Uruguay. It would  be reasonable  to expect  that the affiliates  in the AFP model  may
not see  positive returns  for several  years, even if they save as much as 12-15%  of their
salaries,  and the underlying  assets  perform  well. Permitting  other financial  intermediaries
to manage  mandated  savings  will force  the AFPs to better  control  their largest  costs:
marketing  expenses  and set-up  expenses. In particular,  it seems  possible  to significantly
improve  the outcome  for the affiliates  by permitting  them to invest  in relatively  simple
instruments  such as bank CDs.  In the next sections,  we examine  the regulatory  concerns
that contribute  to segmentation  of mandated  savings  and creation  of these special  purpose
AFPs.15
3.  Investment Regulation
Why Regulate AFP Investments?  Pension fund managers should be clearly
subject to regulation relating to "fit and proper" tests for the managing institution and its
principal officials, financial solvency, avoidance of conflicts of interest (front running,
insider trading, transactions with related banks, brokers, etc.), custodial safeguards for
managed assets, information disclosure, fiduciary responsibility, account keeping, net
asset value calculations, and so forth.  These requirements are fundamental and should be
imposed on all financial intermediaries managing voluntary or mandated savings from the
general public.
But typically, social security reforms have involved much more direct investment
regulation beyond such prudential requirements. As in Chile, such regulation involves
exclusion of certain classes of financial assets altogether (equity investments, at the
beginning of the reform) and/or rather stringent limits and complex selection criteria on
broad classes of assets, individual securities, issuers, and so forth.  These restrictions are
subsequently relaxed somewhat.  Such an approach has become somewhat of a norm. A
common justification is based on problems of illiquidity, trading practices, disclosure and
corporate governance standards, accounting practices  fhd other problems of developing
capital markets.  The argument is that in such situations, it is particularly important that
the retirement savings be invested in "safe" or "prudent" investments.  The role of
regulators in defining "safe" is justified on the ground that having mandated savings, the
state owes a special responsibility to ensure avoidance of "inappropriate" investments by
unsophisticated investors.  In addition, the minimum pension guarantee makes the state
arguably an interested party in the payoff of the investments.8
Risks to be Controlled.  While such a motivation is well-meaning, it is desirable
to examine the role and efficacy of resulting direct investment regulation critically. In
doing so, we assume that the ultimate purpose of reform of PAYG state-run systems is to
create financial security for retirees, by helping them realize the highest rates of returns
consistent with prudent assumption of risks, aided by professional intermediaries.
Further, it is necessary to distinguish between the two rather different risks that the
regulators may try to control by imposing investment restrictions.  First is the inherent
risk of real inviestment,  macroeconomic risks, illiquidity, poor disclosure or corporate
governance standards, etc. which results in uncertain returns and can be summarized as
return volatility.  The second risk relates to the principal-agent problem, i.e. the concern
that the pension fund manager may invest so as to optimize some private objective
function, at the expense of the affiliate.
8  We exclude  from present  consideration  some other  restrictions  which  obviously  seek  other
objectives  than maximize  affiliates'  welfare,  such as requirements  to invest in Treasury  securities  in order
to finance  public  deficit,  to invest in specific  industries  of "national  interest",  to invest  in privatizing
companies,  or to refrain from investing  in foreign  securities.16
Usefulness of Investment Regulation for Return Distribution Risks.  Let us
consider the first risk, within some underlying financial economics model of portfolio
selection.  Under a standard inter-temporal savings-investment decisions model, a rational
economic agent would allocate income between savings and consumption inter-
temporally.  Standard portfolio theory helps define the feasible investment universe and
the efficient frontier of investment possibilities.  The rational individual would select the
right amount of savings and invest them in a portfolio that is both on the efficient frontier,
and maximizes the individual's welfare, given the individual's risk-reward preferences.
Dynamic, repeated solutions of the problem allows for changes in risk preferences, family
or health situation, income level, realized returns, economic conditions, and investment
possibilities.
Consider a typical Markowitz framework, where an investor faces choices in risk-
return space between different portfolios.  As is well-known, in this framework, if
returns on two securities are perfectly positively correlated, their portfolios imply a linear
tradeoff between risks and returns.  Combining two less than perfectly positively
correlated assets, one can improve returns with a less than proportionate increase in risk.
By systematically considering all available securities, and combining less than perfectly
positively correlated assets, an investor would ultimately arrive at a concave (positively
sloped) efficient frontier combining highest returns for each level of risk.  Investors
should then choose portfolios at the point of tangency between their indifference curve
(between risks and returns) and the efficient frontier, as shown in Figure 1.
Now, if in such Markowitz framework, individuals were by and large choosing
tangency portfolios, i.e. maximizing their welfare, it would be such a highly desirable
outcome that there would be extremely little justification for state intervention 9. If
individuals are missing tangency portfolios, either because of inadequate sophistication of
affiliates or fund managers, then regulation may have a role provided that the regulation
increases the probability that savers remain on or close to their tangency portfolio.  Thus
regulation should be designed and judged by the degree to which it achieves this purpose.
This implies that the regulators must estimate the efficient frontier, and issue
regulation such that the probability of investing in a portfolio on the  frontier  is increased,
while that of choosing other portfolios is decreased  It is extremely unlikely that
regulators can do this task systematically better than unconstrained fund managers.
Moreover, regulation purporting to improve portfolio optimization, involves very tight
control over private investment managers and thus a strong implicit responsibility for the
9  One might object  to this reasoning  on the grounds  that some  individuals  may choose  riskier
portfolios  than the government  would  because  of minimum  guarantees.  While  the individual  would
benefit/lose  from only  his own  payoff,  the government  can benefit  from high payoff  to some affiliates
while paying  minimum  pension  to others. The problem  (of individuals  inflicting  losses  on the
government)  would  be significant  only  if the state  creates  a moral hazard  by offering  a high  guaranteed
payoff. That problem  can be resolved  by lowering  the guarantee.17
state for the eventual result. This is clearly not the intention of regulators in most
countries implementing private pension reforms.
Fig. 1:  Basic Markowitz Investment Universe
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Fig. 4:  Effect of Restricting  Equity Investments





A more modest goal of direct investimienit  restrictions could be to simply limit the
f'unld  por-ttiolio  risk to some maximlumii.  In the terminiology  ol'the two-parameter
investmiienlt  world, this would imply placing a vertical bar on the investment opportunity
space  11Figure  2], and rLIlilg  out porttolios  to the righlt  of it. HIowever,  there is simply  no
easy way to regulate the aggregate risk of the porlq1lio.
Wlhat  the regulators canl  and do attemiipt  in practice is to restrict investments in
certaini  securities altogetlher  or as a proportion of total investmiienits.  This is a very
ineflficienit  way to restrict risks.  Figure 3 depicts the effects of disallowing a certain class
of'security (e.g. equities) altogether.  Witlh  such restrictions, thle  portfolios must be
constructed with interest bearinig  securities only which are more highly correlated.  By
eliminiating  the possibility of combining the most imperfectly correlated securities, most
meaninlgfull  opportunities for reducing risks and improving returns are also eliminated.
Additional restrictions concenitrating  investments in the highest credit rating classes
would have the effect of permitting investments in even more highly correlated securities,
offering even more linear risk-return tradeoff:  Essentially, such restrictions bend the
ftasible'  in7veCstmnent  frontier inward and away  from the elfficient  region, which is exactly
the  op)posite  olf  desired efkect. Similar unintended and unfortunate results are achieved by
selectively restricting certain securities, such as stocks with high concentration of
ownership (in Chile), or low turnover (Chile and Mexico)' 0.
The effects of maximum ceilings on certain types of investments (such as no more
than 30% of the portfolio in equities) can be characterized graphically as vertical
boundary limiting investment possibilities [Figure 4]. Again, it is easy to see that such
restrictions disproportionately eliminate the efficient frontier.  As these restrictions get
tighter, they tend to eliminate more and more of the efficient frontier, quite possibly
eliminating the possibility of forming any efficient portfolio at all.
Why then do the regulators impose such investment guidelines?  It is possible that
direct investment restrictions are unconsciously extended from the prudential regulation
from banking or insurance sectors, which (correctly) emphasizes adequate solvency and
liquidity to meet a fixed level of liabilities, to the arena of defined contribution
investment management whose objective is to optimize risk-return tradeoff.  As a result,
pension fund regulation may well be guided by a rather inappropriate notion of risk.  Risk
in financial investment is typically defined as uncertainty that the actual return would
equal expected return (it), and measured by the standard deviation (6) over some horizon,
usually a few months.  This widely used notion may well be the basis of regulatory
10  In Mexico,  although  the pension  reform  laws  permit  administrators  to offer  different  types  of
funds,  regulators  are  planning  to restrict  this  choice  initially  to one  fund  per  administrator
"fundamentally"  invested  in inflation-indexed  debt  instruments.  Except  for  recently  introduced  UDI
(inflation)-linked  bonds,  and  ajustabonos,  there  are  no inflation-linked  securities.  Mexican  authorities
also  contemplate  a plan  wherein  equity  investments,  when  permitted,  would  be limited  to only  53  most
liquid  of the 186  companies  listed  on the  stock  exchange.20
conservatism where stocks are regarded as riskier than bonds, and illiquid securities
would be treated as riskier than liquid securities.
But in mandated pension plans, investments must be made regularly and over long
periods of time.  Consider a situation where the more volatile assets (say, equities) yield
higher long term average returns than the less volatile ones (bonds), but where the fund
managers have little  ability to predict how each will perform in short periods  In this
case, the risk of choosing "equities" over "bonds" is more appropriately defined as
Pr'Rs,  - RI3I}  > 0.  Assuming the long term return distribution parameters are reasonably
stable and multiperiod distributions are not perfectly correlated, this probability rises as
holding period (T) grows.  This would imply that younger workers may deliberately
choose a high risk, high reward strategy, starting with a high allocation of investment in
favor of equity, and gradually reducing the percentage allocation to equity as the time to
retirement (actually, consumption of accumulated savings) approaches.
Investment Regulation and Principal Agent Problem.  Let us consider the
principal agent problem which may have both economic and political significance.  There
are many opportunities for the fund managers to abuse affiliates: through front running
(personal trades placed before fund trades), price manipulation, cheating in NAV
calculations, not applying payments in and out in strict serial order, trading with related
brokers or banks, or in securities of related businesses.  These are well-known and
important problems for which there are well-known regulatory defenses: fit and proper
tests, NAV calculation regime, restrictions on and penalties for front running and insider
trading, reporting requirements, etc..  However, direct investment regulation is at best an
ineffective, and at worst a counterproductive, remedy for these problems.  But ifthe
regulators have strong priors that such problems disproportionately concentrate in certain
types of securities, e.g. with high ownership concentration or illiquidity, then direct
12 investment restrictions may be justified  . In this case, however, similar restrictions
would be equally justified for other types of fund managers, such as mutual funds.
Indeed, there is merit in examining virtually all aspects of pension fund regulation --
applying to eligibility standards, capital requirements, corporate governance, disclosure,
standard of fiduciary care, penalties, and investments -- against relevant regulation for
mutual funds and avoiding multiple standards unless a very clear rationale can be
articulated.
These  are excellent  assumptions  for developed  markets. Given  the shorter  series of returns  on
different  classes  of assets  in developing  countries  and frequency  of policy  changes,  the positive
correlation  between  return  volatility  and means  may be more  difficult  to deduce  formally. However,  it
would  be even  more  difficult  to argue that  the correlation  is negative. Market  timing  may well be a
potentially  more  successful  strategy  in developing  countries  where  greater  policy  changes  may be
expected. To profit from this,  however,  the regulators  would  have  to tolerate  substantial  changes in
portfolio  mix over  short periods,  which  may be again  contrary  to conventional  wisdom.
12  There  is a chicken  and egg problem  here,  i.e. limiting  pension  fund participation  may also
contribute  to or perpetuate  higher concentration  and illiquidity.21
To summarize, direct investment restrictions -- routinely and somewhat
excessively used to control portfolio return variability -- are difficult to justify based on
standard financial theory or the specific objectives of social security reforms.  These
restrictions clearly fail to optimize risk-return tradeoffs since they direct investments
away from, rather than towards, the efficient investment frontier and increase
concentration and diversifiable risks.  They do not necessarily cap risks within intended
limits, cause a disproportionate loss of expected returns, and it is not clear that the
resulting portfolios have necessarily lower risks.  Considering the legitimate changes in
an individual's risk preferences through time due to changes in age, wealth, health and
job security and the changes in investment universe, direct investment restrictions may
hurt most affiliates.  While some regulation may always be justified ex-post 3, in general,
they seem to induce a bias towards under-performance. Agency problems in developing
capital markets may call for strong prudential regulation, and may justify some direct
investment restrictions on illiquid or tightly held securities.  But if so, similar regulation
should be irnposed on mutual funds and other investment managers.
The notion that pension fund investments are collectively special and require
completely special regulation strongly influences the AFP-based pension reform design,
and contributes to the separation of mandated savings industry and its regulator from
other financial intermediaries managing voluntary savings and their regulators.  If
mandated savings are appropriately considered part of the overall savings of the investor,
to be invested according to the different and time-varying circumstances and risk-return
preferences of the affiliates, then the affiliates should be allowed greater freedom in
selection of portfolios.  By extension, it should not be necessary for the fund managers to
offer a single investment portfolio, nor for the affiliates to invest their entire mandated
savings in one portfolio with one financial intermediary.  Finally, if the mandated pension
savings should be invested in differentiated products, and different pension funds can
offer multiple, specialized products such as money market funds, bond funds or stock
funds, there would be little reason to exclude mutual funds, banks, and insurance
companies from offering such products directly to the affiliates.
4.  Competition in Managing Mandated Savings
Effect of Return Guarantees.  As discussed earlier, AFPs in Chile, Argentina,
Uruguay, and Colombia'4 oblige fund managers to guarantee a return within a certain
range.  Given the normal variation in emerging market asset returns, even fund managers
pursuing a logical long term investment strategy and a non-trivial investment in equity or
fixed rate long term bonds would be concerned about the risk of periodically under-
1  3  For instance, the Chilean restrictions on equity investments until 1985 would seem justifiable
ex-post given the negative returns of stocks during 1982-85. [Although fund managers too may have
voluntarily limited their equity investmenits  during this period.] On the other hand, restricting equity
investments to 30% of the portfolio between 1986-95 -- when stock returns were very high --  inflicted
big opportunity losses on funds that migilt have wanted to exceed that limit.
14  Mexico is a notable exception.  Peru has removed these bands.22
performing the minimum benchmark.  Such regulatory benchmarks are frequently
incorporated in the remuneration of pension fund managers.  The return shortfall liability
and the lost bonus would be non-trivial compared to the administrator's return on equity
or the fund manager's remuneration.  As these risks can be easily avoided by investing in
the benchmark (industry) portfolio, the practical outcome of these return bands is to
15 encourage all pension funds to invest in virtually identical portfolios
The Chilean Pension System describes the results in a forthright fashion.
"Administrators  are incited  to invest  on portfolios  similar  to the average  ('herd effect'), which  means  the
method  does not offer different  options for affiliates  showing  diverse  risk and yield  preferences. This is
particularly  pernicious  for old-aged  workers  and for pensioners  with  programmed  withdrawals.  Another
implication  of the 'herd effect' is that it limits  possibilities  of adjusting  the portfolio  when  market
conditions  change....  The lack of diversity  in the investment  policies  increases  the importance  of the sale
representative  in  the affiliate's  decision  .....  There  might  be a de-incentive  for studies  on investments  from
the smaller  AFPs' part, since  they would  just limit  themselves  to doing  whatever  their competitors  were
doing."
Exclusion of Other Intermediaries and Alternative Financial Products.  The
typical AFP-based reform confers a collective monopoly of managing mandated savings
to pension funds.  The experience of Chile and Peru suggested several disadvantages to
the affiliates from such a design: large set-up costs that could be avoided or reduced,
large marketing expenses that do not bring better or different products or improve
investor education, and forcing uninformed decisions initially by requiring the affiliates
to choose between managers with no track record.
While these costs to the affiliates are the driving factors, regulators should also
worry about creating a competitive and even playing field for different financial
intermediaries and economies of scale. The essential functions of the pension funds
(collection, investments, and withdrawals) are easily performed by mutual funds. Indeed,
a large number of mutual funds were already operational when pension reforms were
initiated in many countries.  In Chile and Mexico, the mutual funds were already
managing a significant amount of funds. Virtually all reforming countries permit the
pension funds to invest in mutual funds, bank CDs, and Treasury securities, but don't
allow diversified or money market mutual funds or banks to manage pension savings
directly.  While some direct competition may or may not be feasible at the early stage, the
funds may be expected to resist, with increasing success as their assets and lobbying
power grows, such competition in the future.  Pension fund regulators themselves may
not be neutral to removing some market segmentation and unifying relevant regulation.
In many countries, the unequal playing field between different financial intermediaries is
1  5  Indeed,  the task of copying  the industry  portfolio  is made  rather  easy by the periodic
publication of the detailed portfolio composition of all funds by the regulators.  In practice, the fund
managers do not even need an identical portfolio; any portfolio highly correlated to the benchmark
would  suffice. Thus seemingly  different  portfolios  from  different  pension  funds may nonetheless  offer
no meaningful choices to the affiliates.23
taken a step further.  While other financial intermediaries are prevented from managing
mandated savings, pension funds are permitted to compete for voluntary savings.  Such
lack of competition can only encourage more expensive business and marketing
strategies, higher costs and commissions passed on to the affiliates,
Restrictions  on Workers' Choice of Fund.  In Chile, Peru, and Argentina,
pension regulations allow each worker to invest in only one pension fund.  In Mexico, the
law allows each worker to invest in multiple funds offered by the same administrator, but
the choice is initially limited to a single fund investing in inflation-linked debt securities.
Typically, the workers cannot switch between funds more than once or twice a year.
These restrictions force each pension fund to attempt to invest in all financial markets.  In
some economies, it may be more cost-efficient for administrators to specialize in debt and
money market instruments (e.g. for funds led by commercial banks), bonds, or equity
investments.  Second, these restrictions make it impossible for the affiliates to gradually
change the risks of their portfolio as they age and become more risk averse.  Finally,
these restrictions subtly discourage new entry. Affiliates cannot "try out" a new fund
with a small amount of their nest egg.  They must either invest nothing or all.
5.  The Effect of Commission Structure on Costs and Incentives
Mutual funds and other money managers typically collect commissions as a
percentage of assets managed.  In contrast, the pension funds charge the bulk of the
commissions as a percentage of salaries.16 Though seemingly innocuous, this difference
generates important unintended and undesirable consequences.
To see this, consider a private pension system with these assumptions.  Wages
grow at 6% p.a., pension fund portfolios grow at 10% p.a., affiliates pay 14% of salary
into a funded account, of which 1 percentage point is paid towards insurance, another 3
percentage points go as commissions to pension funds, and 10% of salary is credited in
the individual pension fund account.  We compare the commissions in this pension fund
account, with the alternative of charging commissions of 2% p.a. on assets managed.  We
compute and cumulate commissions under these two methods through time,
compounding at the rate of return on investments.  Table 8 summarizes the results of this
comparison.
16  Variable  commissions  on assets  under  management  are permitted  by law  in Argentina,  Bolivia,
Mexico,  Peru, and Uruguay  but are charged  by AFPs. Chile  permitted  such  commissions  but discontinued
them since 1987.24
Table 8:  Commission Structure
Cumulative  Actual
Cumulative  Cumulative  Commissions  Commission/
Investment  Commission  Cumulative  Commission/  (% of assets  Normal
Year  (% of salary)  Returns  Returns  managed)  Commission
(a)  (b)  (a/b)  (c)  (a/c)
5  22.5  18.5  1.21  4.6  4.88
10  66.2  89.0  0.74  25.6  2.58
15  146.9  256.0  0.57  85.1  1.73
20  290.4  600.2  0.48  226.9  1.28
25  539.8  1250.6  0.43  536.2  1.01
30  965.7  2428.5  0.40  1173.0  0.82
35  1684.3  4500.1  0.37  2432.0  0.69
40  2885.3  8070.1  0.36  4859.6  0.59
Note: Based  on an assumption  that wages  grow at 6% p.a., pension  fund portfolios  grow at 10%  p.a., affiliates  pay
14%  of salary into a funded  account,  of which  I percentage  point is paid towards  insurance,  another  3 percentage
points  go as commissions  to pension  funds,  and 10%  of salary is credited  in the individual  pension  fund account.
Table 8 reveals many tendencies inherent in typical commission structure of
private pension systems.  First, it shows that the pension funds take the lion's  share of the
returns in initial years by way of commissions.  Second, as the ratio of commissions to
returns exceeds one for several years, the affiliates make negative returns for several
years.  This is consistent with the low or negative net intemal rates of return realized by
the Chilean and Peruvian affiliates for several years.
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Second, the salary based commissions exceed asset based commissions for 25
years. The extent of  "prepayment" is naturally related to the level of asset based charges
we assume and would be lower if asset-based fees were higher. Chart 1 compares
commissions of 2-4% of salaries against asset-based fees ranging from 1-3.5% p.a..  It
shows that within these ranges, affiliates would have "prepaid" for future services from25
nine to 55 years. Under many different circumstances, it appears that the salary based
commissions result in prepayment by the affiliates to an extraordinary degree.
This large prepayment of expenses by the affiliates introduces several distortions
and undesirable tendencies.  First, the countries that choose to encourage rather than force
conversion to a privately managed funded pension system are handicapped in "selling"
the system.  Second, the prepayment permits and quite possibly encourages many AFPs
to undertake heavy expenses (such as marketing or set-up) that they would otherwise
need to finance themselves and therefore avoid. It may also encourage entry of more
AFPs than the system can reasonably support, given the fixed costs and economies of
scale, implying some of the AFPs may fail relatively soon. The experiences of Chile and
Peru are consistent with these inferences.
Third, even if the initial assumptions hold for the entire working life of the
affiliates, older workers lose systematically vis-a-vis younger workers and will not be
compensated for their initial prepayment.  For instance, under Table 8 assumptions, if
workers retire at age 60, anyone joining the system at age 35 or later would forfeit a part
of their prepayment in favor of the AFPs or younger workers.  Obviously, no socially
desirable purpose is intended or achieved through such cross-subsidy.
Fourth, an AFP in the initial stages of the affiliation would receive significantly
more  "prepaid" income than another joining the system at a more mature stage.  To the
extent that some of the AFPs fail and exit the system during initial period, as 10 out of 25
have in Chile or 3 out of 8 in Peru, without fully honoring their "prepaid" service
commitments, there is a transfer of resources from surviving AFPs or contributors to
failing AFPs.  Given the weak state of competition in the industry, it is likely that this
cost would fall largely upon the affiliates.
Finally, salary-based commissions subtly discourage competition from more cost-
efficient new AFPs in the future.  For instance, suppose a new asset manager ("Fidelity")
wants to enter the business in the 25th year following the reform, when the new entrants
to the labor force are relatively few.  To break-even with a pool of seasoned affiliates
with higher accumulated balances and lower fee:assets ratio compared to new entrants,
the new manager must charge fees based on the large balance, thus raising hurdles for
potential entrants to the system.
Table 8 shows that if the initial assumptions hold for 40 years, the salary-based
commissions may be less than the asset-based charges.  But this is unlikely to happen due
to the large number of complicated implicit contracts that need be sustained between the
AFPs and between AFPs and affiliates.  Few AFPs explicitly recognize the front-end
nature of the commissions and none is known to actually defer income recognition to
future years and reserve against current income.  Neither tax law nor standard accounting
practices may permit such deferral.  (Indeed, the typical fund in Chile, Argentina and
Peru has incurred sizable losses in the initial years, while fully recognizing all the
commissions received.)  Thus, "prepaid" portion of the commissions would be taxed,
distributed and will likely be reflected in equity prices.  Future AFP shareholders would26
expect a return on equity commensurate to the current share prices and raise charges.
The system thus encourages a tendency to raise charges significantly in the future.
The above problems are amenable to very simple solution, requiring AFPs to
charge commissions on the basis of assets managed, in addition to very small transaction
fees (say, a few cents) for typical transactions.  While AFPs should be free to charge asset
commissions without regulatory caps, and with or without loyalty discounts, they should
also be required to publish gross and net retumns  after expenses on a quarterly basis.
These changes are essentially purely technical and do not restrict profitability of the AFPs
in any way.  Yet, they can cause AFPs with significant reputation capital to shy away
from taking the lion's share of return on affiliates' capital and instead opt for low cost
marketing and business strategies more oriented towards maximizing net returns than
market share.  It would also permit greater transparency in assessing the value added by
the AFPs.
6.  Effects of Adverse Incentives to Competition
To summarize, the AFP model suffers from myriad disincentives to competition
that could lower net returns and suitability of investment portfolio for the affiliate.  These
range from direct restrictions on competition from domestic banks, mutual funds, or
insurance companies; disincentives to product-based competition among pension funds;
excessive restrictions on investments; restrictions on the affiliates' ability to allocate
savings across multiple funds; a front-loaded commission structure that create
extraordinary possibilities for excessive marketing or set-up costs; difficulties of
comparing returns of pension funds versus other intermediaries and reduced incentives
for specialization, innovation, and efficiency among the AFPs.
Because pension funds make such long term and sizable investments, even
modest diseconomies, inefficiencies and bad incentives can create enormous welfare
losses for the retirees and the economy.  Just how large can the potential losses be?
Suppose wage growth rate averages 6% p.a., and investment returns are 10% from a less
competitive system, versus 12-13% from a more efficient system and less constrained
17 investments  , and an accumulation period of 40 years.  Under these assumptions, a
worker with the more efficient investments/manager earning 12% p.a. will retire with
over 61% bigger pension.  If these advantages add up to 3%, the worker would retire with
more than twice the pension.
Dramatic as they are, such comparisons are illustrative of the likely effect of
efficiency losses in developing countries.  The range of returns on different classes of
17  In relation to observable long term return differentials between alternative investment
strategies and managerial efficiency in already open, highly competitive mutual fund markets in
developed countries, these differentials are extremely modest.  The conclusions are broadly similar at
different wage rates or investment yields.  Essentially, each percentage point in average investment
returns improves pensions by a quarter or more.27
assets in developing countries and the variation in investment management performance
in open, competitive markets (such as the US mutual funds) are much wider.  Nor do
these estimates consider the secondary effects of better pension fund performances on
aggregate investments and growth in the economy, on incentives to add voluntary savings
to mandated savings, and the substantial investments continuing for another 20 years or
so during retirement.
7.  Alternative Design of Private Pension Systems
The preceding discussion suggests the following directions in which the
developing countries introducing or modifying social security reforms may improve upon
the original AFP-based model.  We will call this alternative Personal Retirement Account
(PRA) system.
*  Permit variable commissions based on assets managed only and not on salaries.
Otherwise, levels of commissions will not be regulated.
*  Returns on mandated savings must be reported gross and net of all commissions
and costs, expressed as percentage of average assets held.
*  Remove or avoid imposing return bands (which were never imposed in Mexico,
and are being removed in Peru).
*  Remove or reduce the minimum return guarantees for the mandated retirement
savings system.  Some minimum welfare guarantees may be provided, if so
desired, under the public pillar.
*  Significantly relax investment regime for mandated savings.
*  Permit investment in multiple accounts by the affiliates (as is provided by the
law in Mexico and is being considered in Chile).
*  Permit highly rated banks, diversified mutual funds, and highly rated insurance
companies to offer their usual products such as deposit accounts, CDs, mutual
funds, and annuities.  Leave open the possibility of participation by other
financial intermediaries and products as these markets develop.
•  Intermediaries must not discriminate against mandated savings accounts.
A full treatment of the PRA system is beyond the scope of this paper.
Operational details of such a system would vary depending upon the extent of reforms
above implemented and specific country-specific characteristics. But it is useful to
sketch the functioning of the PRA system incorporating most of the above
recommendations in some details.  To do so, we focus on the two functions of the AFPs:
collection and investment, and provision of death and disability insurance.  Because we
wish to focus on the problems of admitting different institutions in managing retirement28
savings, the third function currently carried out by the AFPs, i.e. payment of retirement
pensions, is excluded as that market is already partly open.  For instance, in Chile, a
retiree may obtain a programmed withdrawal from the AFP or an annuity from insurance
company.
Operation of Personal Retirement Account System.  At an operational level,
the basic intuition and processing of the PRA system is very simple and similar to the
existing Chilean and other AFP systems.  The latter essentially permit an affiliate to buy
shares in a fund, together with periodic death and disability insurance, which the AFP
negotiates on a wholesale basis.  The affiliate can transport this balance between different
AFPs.  Operationally, the PRA system simply extends these investment possibilities and
transportability beyond the AFPs.  The affiliate can now also move between AFPs as well
as certain authorized banks ("buying" deposits), mutual funds or pension funds (buying
shares), or insurance companies (buying annuities).  The PRA system would differ
materially from the AFP-based system in that the balance can be transferred between
AFPs as well as banks, mutual funds, and insurance companies.  Second important
difference is that the affiliate can transfer partial balances between their PRA accounts.
The state may tolerate (but will not impose) minimum stay periods dictated by providers,
say, up to six months, and small and reasonable transaction costs.
Transfers.  The state must ensure that mandated savings are "blocked" in PRA
accounts only and are not available for consumption.  To achieve this, each PRA offerer
would make any payment either directly to another PRA offerer or through a special
payment instrument (check, electronic transfer instruction, etc.) that is designated "PRA".
In all other respects, the payment would be processed like other similar payments.
Banks, mutual funds, pension funds, may even give the affiliates a special check book;
(say, for the sake of exposition, color coded "red").  Unlike normal ("green") checks,
which can be cashed or used to pay for groceries or utility bills, "red" PRA checks can
only be used for depositing into another PRA account.  This can eliminate some of the
bureaucracy associated with current transfer form based mechanisms between the AFPs.
Investments, Acceptance and Costs.  Of course, the accounts offered by these
institutions will represent investments in very different portfolios.  They may also have
different acceptance and qualification requirements and commissions. Bank accounts
may involve no minimum balances, and smallest explicit commissions and costs.  Some
mutual and pension funds may require minimum balances and would charge asset-based
commissions and possibly some fixed transaction costs.  Periodic statements will show
all costs and commissions expressed as percentage of assets under management, and
gross and net returns.
Collections.  Collections may be made by a state agency, as is the case in
Mexico, Argentina, or Uruguay or by a private investment manager (bank, mutual fund,
AFP, etc.) with whom the affiliate has the designated account.  To simplify oversight of
mandatory payroll deductions, the state collecting agency or the employer may be29
responsible  for depositing  money  in only one designated  account  of the affiliate  for which
the affiliate  would provide standard  payment  ID details  to the employer.
Death and Disability Insurance.  In the AFP model,  the AFP chooses  insurer.
In the simplest  PRA model,  this choice  will be exercised  by an investment  manager
(bank,  AFP, mutual fund,  or insurance  company)  designated  by the affiliate. However,
even  greater competition  and transparency  in insurance  purchase  is possible  since
mandated  death and disability  insurance  offers considerable  possibilities  of complete
standardization,  parameterization  by salary  and minimal  biographic  variables,  elimination
of adverse  selection,  oversight  of service  and investment  standards  by the regulator,  and
therefore  commodity-type  price-based  competition. This may  be done by permitting  the
employers  to purchase  highly standard  coverage  directly  from insurance  companies,  paid
for by payroll  deductions.  Negotiation  of insurance  coverage  by employers  may lower
premia and help prevent  some  of the obvious  possibilities  of "sweetheart"  deals between
insurance  companies  and related  AFPs, banks,  etc..
Eligibility of Provider.  We envisage  a situation  where  the affiliate  can buy all
the normal  bank deposit  products  -- from passbook  savings  accounts  to CDs, shares  in an
AFP, mutual  fund shares,  an insurance  company  annuity  or endowment  policy,  etc.. The
regulators  can determine  the eligibility  standards  (e.g. rating of banks and insurance
companies),  products  (to verify  full disclosure,  correctness  of prospectus,  etc.)  and in case
of AFPs and  mutual funds, the investment  composition. The last will focus on
diversification,  specifying  limits  on investments  in individual  instruments  as a share of
fund assets and of the issuer's total liabilities. But beyond  that, it will permit
specialization  by permitting  funds invested  entirely  in money  market  instruments,  bonds,
equities, etc..18
The affiliate  may  retire investments  in the normal  fashion  depending  on type of
investment. For instance,  retirement  of an PRA (normal)  mutual fund or CD account
would  result in a red (green)  check from the fund or the bank. The red check  can be
deposited  in the bank,  into another  mutual  fund, AFP, etc. 19. All PRA accounts  will
include  normal  ID particulars,  including  age, social security  number,  etc.. When  the
affiliate  reaches  retirement  age, withdrawals  from PRA accounts  will be paid by green
checks.
A visual representation  of the "AFP-based"  system  and the PRA System  would
look like Figures 5  and 6.
18  Eventually,  the laws may  even permit  direct  investments  in stocks,  housing,  etc. with
safeguards  deemed  suitable  for  the level  of capital  market  development  and resources  of the individual.
19  A system  of actual  "red" and "green" checks,  or electronic  credits is preferred,  because  of its
transparency  and ease  of understanding.  The system  can, however,  operate  with  the more  bureaucratic
transfer  forms  used in the AFP system.30
Fig. 5:  Financial  System with the Chilean-style  AFPs
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In such a system, the distinctions between the pension funds and mutual funds
will greatly diminish, especially if as we suggest, a deliberate attempt is made to
harmonize prudential regulation"  between pension and mutual funds, elevating mutual
fund fiduciary responsibility standards where necessary. In this case, most market
participants would form families of mutual funds, some of which will be eligible for both
mandated and voluntary savings, some others possibly only for voluntary savings.  One
may expect that in this case, the current enforcement and supervision role of the AFP
regulators may diminish considerably and all supervision responsibility may rest with the
securities regulators.  Even so, a regulatory body focusing on pension fund issues only
may be retained.  Its principal function then would be determining eligibility standards
for PRA products and intermediaries.
If a country retains important differences between prudential and eligibility
requirements applicable to pension and mutual funds (e.g. higher capital requirements,
higher fiduciary obligations on directors, etc.), pension funds may continue to be formed
as distinct legal entities.  In this case, the pension regulator would continue to have the
comprehensive role of current AFP administrators.
Oversight of PRA accounts, investments, service standards, client complaints, etc.
will be carried out in the normal fashion by bank, insurance, and securities regulators
with respect to their regulated subjects. However, these regulators would have the
additional responsibility of ensuring that withdrawals and transfers from or between
PRAs comply with the age and encashability requirements, exactly as such restrictions
apply to the AFPs currently.  Again, a "red" and "green" check system would greatly
reduce the monitoring of compliance.
The proposed PRA system preserves all of the existingfinancial  infrastructure,
institutions, and normal client-provider relationships. It permits free, but prudentially
regulated, healthy competition between different financial institutions and products,
forcing all of them an equal chance at managing mandated savings, without providing
AFPs an oligopolistic access.  Finally, the substantial setup costs of the pensionfunds
and regulators would be reduced.
8.  Transition and Other Issues in Implementation
This section deals with the more general concerns and criticisms about the PRA
proposal that may be anticipated and have been raised in the course of prior discussions.
The pace and comprehensiveness of implementation of the reforms advocated here would
necessarily vary given the initial legal structures, political preferences and influences,
market conditions, and so forth.  A full treatment of the transition and feasibility issues
would necessarily require further work in specific country context.  However, many of
20  Relating  to diversification  requirements,  independence  of promoters,  managers,  etc., NAV
calculations,  valuation,  restrictions  on front-running,  insider  trading,  fiduciary  responsibility,  oversight
provisions,  etc..32
the generic  issues are obviously  important  and need to be addressed  in future work. We
group our proposals  and possible  counter  arguments  under several  headings:  commission
structure,  investment  regulations,  return  bands,  competition. The last topic has many
aspects:  one-fund  per manager  rule,  one account  per affiliate  rule, and permitting
different  instruments  and intermediaries.
Commissions,  Expenses  and Net Returns  Reporting. Of all the above
proposals,  charging  asset-based  commissions  and mandating  reporting  of net returns  are
the easiest  to implement  technical  reforms,  and a necessary  requirement  for transparency
in mandated  savings  schemes. If principal  partners  in AFPs have strong  reputations
capital  at stake,  these changes  can be powerful  tools to reorient  the AFPs to optimizing
net returns for the affiliates. There is little public  policy  justification  in not implementing
these changes. But some  AFPs that prefer  to have  a large  cushion  to cover high
marketing  and set-up  expenses  or the inherent  lack  of transparency  of salary-based
commissions  and gross  returns  reporting,  may  be inclined  to oppose  them. AFPs -- like
any new business  -- may have  higher essential  set-up  costs  initially  and satisfy  long term
needs. But we see  no more merit  in prepaying  new AFPs for future services  than say, a
new bank, a new mutual  fund, or for that matter  a new grocery  store,  or a barbershop  --
all of which also cater to long term needs.
Chile and others  are now  considering  permitting  loyalty discounts  to affiliates
increasing  with length  of affiliation. Loyalty  discounts  can reduce some  of the transfers 2 1
and are a step in the right direction. But alone,  they are only a palliative  that will solve
few of the distorted  incentives  of salary-based  commission  structure  discussed  above.
Investment  Guidelines. Relaxation  of investment  guidelines  -- though relatively
frequently  carried  out in many countries  -- may require  legislative  changes  in many
countries. We advocate  more  relaxed investment  guidelines  not as some  kind of
libertarian  ideal,  and this paper should  not be read as advocating  a single  security
investment,  investment  in derivatives,  or some  other extreme  or leveraged  strategy.
Rather  we argue  against  restrictions  on specific  classes  of securities  or their shares  in
aggregate  investments  because  they rarely achieve  their loosely  defined  purposes  or
lowering  risks  or optimizing  portfolio,  and are more likely  to concentrate  portfolio  risks
and eliminate  efficient  frontier. The sort of investment  guidelines  -- requiring  significant
diversification,  but simultaneously  permitting  clearly  distinguishable  money  market,
21  The large  incidence  of transfers  results  not from fickleness  of affiliates,  but from the deliberate
and  very expensive  inducement  of transfers  by the AFPs. Transfers  are not observed  as a similarly  big
problem  in banks  or mutual  funds  the world  over  where  transfers  are quite unrestricted  but net returns  and
transparency  are emphasized  except  in Japan,  where  high  transfers  are observed  in mutual  fund market.
Direct  restrictions  on transfers  by affiliates  (longer  minimum  periods  or administrative  hurdles)  may help
reduce  some administrative  costs  if they are not draconian,  but again  miss the fundamental  problem  of the
perverse  incentives  of the AFPs,  who would  be free to spend  proportionately  more on the fewer  transfers
possible.33
bonds, or stocks fumds  -- considered prudent for mutual funds would suffice.  Indeed, we
strongly favor equality between mutual and pension fund prudential regulation unless a
very clear rationale for distinction can be articulated.
One frequent defense of strict direct investment controls is that it helps maintain
greater parity between investment returns across all affiliates.  While this is certainly the
case, we see no reason why this is a defensible objective of a defined contribution plan,
whose participants clearly have very different age, wealth, health and other characteristics
resulting in different levels of risk aversion.
Elimination of Return Guarantees.  Removal of return bands imposed on AFPs
and reducing the minimum pension guarantees may meet with considerable political and
philosophical opposition.  Irrespective of whatever equity, parity or other plausible
objective may be intended of return guarantees from the AFPs, their unintended effects
are to reduce or eliminate investment portfolio choice, incentives to educate affiliates,
acquire investment skills and the affiliates' ability to punish profligate managers.
A state guarantee of minimum pension or minimum return may be even more
difficult to remove and is frequently cited as an important reason for state intervention in
portfolio choice.  Such a guarantee may well be essential for forging consensus on the
reform of PAYG social security system in the first place.  However, a minimum pension
or return guarantee from the state does not justify drastic restrictions on investment
choices. Rather, the cost of such guarantees should be explicitly assessed -- using option
valuation techniques -- under conservative scenarios regarding investment returns.  A
large contingent exposure would imply failure to achieve the basic objective of
rationalizing the fiscal burden of the PAYG system, and suggest rethinking the basic
parameters of the reform, i.e. contribution rates, retirement age, minimum pension, etc..
More likely, in systems with contribution rates of above 10%, such calculations
will show the low level of such contingent exposure relative to the stake of affiliates. For
instance, Chile guarantees a minimum pension of around 75% of minimum wages (in
1993). Zurita (1994) shows that the present value of this contingent liability (maturing
over some 40 years) amounts to 3.05-3.77% of current annual GDP corresponding to
return volatility of 4-7% p.a. [a 95% confidence interval of annual return range of around
16-27%] for all active and non-active affiliates. Even allowing for substantial
underestimation, this liability is only of the order of 3-6 months'  return on the affiliates'
portfolio.  If the minimum guarantees are set at a reasonably low level, and some of the
changes we propose benefit the affiliates and raise their net returns, they will also tend to
reduce the government's cost of the minimum guarantee.
Multiple  Funds  or Accounts.  If return bands on AFPs are dropped or
sufficiently relaxed and investment guidelines are sufficiently relaxed, there is little
public policy reason to prevent AFPs from offering more than one fund, or affiliates from
having more than one account.  The minimum balance requirements, additional
transaction costs, paperwork and follow-up should all prevent affiliates from frivolously34
acquiring multiple accounts.  The state may impose some maximum market share limits
(as in case of Mexican AFOREs) to prevent monopolistic power or some maximum
account limit (say, five per affiliate) to avoid excessive transaction costs.
Multiple Classes of Intermediaries.  Many scholars caution against opening up
the retirement savings market to multiple classes of interemediaries for a variety of
reasons.  In order to focus on key issues, we will just consider mutual funds, who invest
in other securities, and banks, who offer their own debt claims (as would largely be the
case for insurance companies).
The legal structure and investment management processes of a mutual fund and
AFP are essentially identical: both separate affiliates' funds from those of the managers
and have similar custodial and other characteristics. Some experts argue against
participation of mutual funds on the grounds that the mutual funds and their regulators
are relatively underdeveloped in many countries.  While this may well be the case
(Mexico, and to a lesser extent, Chile being the only countries with a noteworthy mutual
'und industry upon initiation of social security reforms), it is hardly an argument in favor
of setting up AFPs or their regulator who obviously do not exist at all.  If current mutual
fund prudential regulations are not stringent enough, pension regulators may consider
specifying more stringent criteria acceptable for retirement accounts -- which would lead
to welcome integration and improvement of mutual fund standards.  But we see little
justification in eliminating all existing and future mutual funds as potential competitors
from retirement savings market.
There are well-known and legitimate concerns about the safety of the banking
system, possibilities of fraud, and weaknesses in bank regulation in many countries.
Banks also do not segregate, like a mutual or pension fund, the resulting investments in
separate "fund", their investments are largely unquoted and illiquid, and there may be
unique opportunities for fraud in the banking system.  Regulators should certainly prevent
investment of retirement savings in weak banks.  However, this is easily achieved by
restricting the affiliates, as well as AFPs, to banks satisfying certain acceptable rating
criteria.  Why weaken competition in management of retirement savings by preventing all
banks from offering bank products to affiliates?  Opponents of bank participation in
direct retirement accounts ignore the fact that AFPs do invest significantly (over half in
Peru) in bank paper, that the AFPs are frequently owned by banks, or that in countries
with weak banking system, other financial investments frequently suffer even greater
volatility or risks than bank deposits.
There may be better arguments for restricting banks in the initial stage of social
security reforms.  In countries where banks are the dominant intermediaries, they may
grab the largest share of retirement savings initially, investing them in the usual banking
business, without contributing much to development of markets for stocks, bonds, asset-
backed securities, or commercial paper.  Their initial dominant position may tend to
exclude, without any special regulatory treatment, mutual and pension funds.  There may
be thus some merit -- under very limited circumstances -- in providing a special head start35
of a year or two to presumed longer term investors -- such as mutual funds and pension
funds, or limiting offer of bank products to money market accounts (with the usual
investment criteria applying to such accounts).  But while the banks may not be the most
aggressive promoters of capital markets, our experience is that the underdevelopment of
capital markets is far more readily identifiable with very specific aspects of law and
regulation, taxation, policy, and government ownership of real sector. And regulatory
favoritism between different financial intermediaries is more likely to result in
unintended and costly reduction of competition and efficiency rather than development of
capital markets.
Suppose there are severe enough problems with the banking sector accounting,
quality of data, regulation, and enforcement that rating systems cannot meaningfully
discriminate between sound and unsound banks.  Presumably, in this case, the state
permits non-mandated savings to be invested in the banking sector only at great potential
losses to the depositors or the society at large.  But in such extreme cases of weaknesses
in financial condition, regulation and enforcement, exclusivity of the AFPs alone would
not protect the affiliates from otherwise unacceptable risks of investing in local financial
assets-- especially if the AFPs are related to existing financial institution owners.  Such
serious problems may well suggest postponing social security reforms until the more
fundamental financial sector problems are addressed.  If, for political reasons, social
security reforms must be pressed forward, participation of financial institutions with deep
sectoral and regulatory problems may be postponed until these are addressed.  However,
this means merely that the participation of the banks should be postponed till these
problems are addressed, rather than permanent Chilean style Chinese walls.
Ease of Lauinch. In terms of launching a private system, the PRA approach
would be simpler.  The PRA system may seem more complex because more than one
type of intermediary is potentially eligible.  But because it requires no new institutions on
day one, it may be significantly easier to launch. The existing intermediaries (banks,
mutual funds, and insurance companies) would suffice to launch the system.  Most
affiliates would initially invest mandated savings in the banking system and only
gradually move into other products as they accumulate larger balances.  This could
reduce the period between legislative reforms and launching of the system.
Rating.  Participation of individual commercial banks in managing pension assets
would be subject to eligibility (rating) requirements.  Restricting participation of banks
to clearly defensible higher rating standards, as well as temporary suspensions during
known illiquidity or other problems, may be justified.  Insurance companies should be
treated similarly as banks, since their PRA products will be liabilities of the institutions.
Their participation may be restricted to higher credit rated institutions, and suspended
during periods of sectoral maladies.  Ratings may not be relevant for pension and mutual
funds.  Prudential issues concerning the mutual funds' management of pension assets are
relatively easily resolved with the definition of retirement eligible products and
appropriate custodial and prudential regulation.36
9.  Conclusion.
Many developing countries in Latin America and elsewhere are undertaking
salutary reforms of the national social security systems, and encouraging transfer from
the national PAYG system to privately managed funded system.  These reforms are
frequently bolder than in many developed countries, and undertaken despite many fiscal
and political constraints.
These reforms deserve encouragement, but it is worth recognizing some of the
limitations of regulation of private pension funds.  Such regulation excludes competition
from other intermediaries and products, and discourages it between pension funds
themselves by providing incentives to invest in similar portfolios.  It encourages large
marketing costs, without encouraging provision of better investment products or investor
education, while denying the affiliates access to simpler unmanaged products requiring
little or no management costs.  It forces affiliates into similar portfolios with no regard to
the large differences in their balances, age, job and financial security, and risk
preferences.  We find little justification for the "one-size-fits-all" investment regime in
basic financial theory.  Finally, we find a peculiar front-loaded commission structure that
creates further possibilities of higher costs in the future for the affiliates.  We show that
even small losses in returns to affiliates caused by these distorted incentives can reduce
retirement nest-eggs by very sizable amounts. We show that most of the expected
tendencies of the system are revealed in Chile and Peru, where the affiliates lost virtually
their entire investment income in the initial 3-5 years, due to high set-up and marketing
expenses that the affiliates cannot avoid.
This paper proposes that other financial intermediaries, such as banks or mutual
funds, be permitted to directly manage mandated savings.  Mutual funds can very easily
offer retirement accounts similar to those offered by the pension funds.  Banks can offer
standard banking accounts, CDs, etc. while insurance companies can offer annuity
products directly. While pension funds may still be formed, other intermediaries will
compete with the pension funds.  This would reduce initial regulatory and set-up costs
greatly, and force pension funds to manage their investment vehicles within reasonable
shares of the value they can add relative to other investments.  Simple mechanisms that
parallel the arrangements in voluntary savings investment are described to implement
such an alternative. Further work should be undertaken to examine and perfect
operational arrangements of this alternative approach in individual country situations.37
PENSION REFORMS IN LATIN AMERICA
CHILE  PERU  ARGENTINA  COLOMBIA  MEXICO  BOLIVIA
YEAR IMPLEMENTED  1981  1993  1994  1994  1995  1996
Transifion  arrangements:  Continues  with  Continues  with changes  Continues with  Continues with
What happens to the old system?  Phased out  changes  changes  Eliminateda  changes
Is current  labor force allowed  to  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  No'  Nob
remain in old scheme?
Is new system mandatory  for new  Yes  No  No  No  Yes  Yes
labor force entrants?
Can workers  switch  back to public  No  No  No  Yes, every three  No'  No
system  after  entering  AFP?  (after June  1996)  years
Recognition  bonds  Yes  Yes'  Yesd  Yes'  Nof  Yes
5
Profile  of new  pension fund  scheme:  Minimum  pension  MPGe  Flat and minimum  MPG  MPG  Non-contributory
Role for public  pillar?  guarantee  (MPG)  Social  Assistance  pension  Social  assistance  Social Quota  minimum  pension benefit
Social  assistance  Social Assistance
Total  contribution  rate for new system:  10  Priv: 8 (10 on 1/97)  8  10  6,5+5.0+(I-5.5V  10
available  for old age annuity  Public: I I(max 13)
disability/survivors/administrative  3  0.3  3  3.5  4.0  2.5
public  pillar and social assistance  General  revenues  1  16'  1  General Revenues  Capitalization
Revenues
Total contribution  rate:
before reform  19  9  27  8(priv. sector)  15.5  9.0 and 18'
after reform  13  13.3  27  13.5-14.5k  16.5-21.0  12.5
Basis  of fee:  Included  in payroll  Included in payroll  Included  in payroll  Included in payroll  Included  in payroll  Included in payroll
contribution,  and is  contribution,  and is  contribution,  and is  contribution,  and is  contribution  and is  contribution  and is
based on a % of  based on a % of salary  based on % of salary  based on a % of  based on % of salary  based on % of salary.
salary  (avg. 2.02%  of salary)  or flat amt per  salary (avg. 1.48%  of  and/or  % of assets
transaction  (avg. 3.44%  salary)  managed.
of salary)
Max  % of portfolio  allowed in:
Domestic  equities  30  35  50  30  0  Regulation to be
Foreign  equities  10  5  10  15  0  issued
Govemment  securities  (in  1994)  45  40  50  50  100 (in  1997)
Minimum  rates  of return  of private  Benchmark  relative  Benchmark  relative  to  Benchmark  relative
pension  funds  to market average  None  market average  to synthetic portfolio  None  None
Government  guarantees  on rates of  Difference  between  Difference  between  Difference  between  Difference  between
return of  private pension  funds.  balance at  balance at retirement  None  balance at retirement  balance at retirement  None
_______  _.  retirement  and MPG  and MPG  and MPG  and MPG38
Notes:
a. Contributions  to the old system  will cease  on June 30, 1997. Transition  workers  can choose  at retirement  the higher  of the benefits  available  under
the old PAYG  scheme  or the new defined-contribution  plan.
b.  Except  those who  meet the requirements  for retirement  under  rules of the old system  by the date AFPs start operating.
c.  Only  workers  who have contributed  for at least  48 months in the last 10  years and have at least 6 months  prior to entering  the new system.
d.  "Compensatory  pension"  is paid upon retirement,  not as a bond. The value is  based on years of contribution  and last ten years' earnings.
e.  Workers  with fewer  than 150  weeks of contributions  are not eligible for a recognition  bond.
f. Disclosure  of expected  current  and future  fiscal  costs  would be made on an annual  basis.
g.  The value  is based  on years  of contribution  and the last  monthly salary  earned.
h. MPG introduced  with second  round of reforms  in 1995,  but regulations  have  not been issued.
i.  This is paid by the employer.
j.  Including  contributions  to the individual  AFORE  account,  INFONAVIT  and the value  of Social  Quota contribution  by the government. The Social  Quota, initially  New Peso I
per day, is indexed  to the CPI  and estimated  at I and 5.5 percent  depending  on worker's income,  with  an average  of 2.2% of wages for  all workers.
k.  The rate shown  is for both private  and public  sector  and for 1996  and the following  year. Contribution  rate increased  gradually  during 1994-96.
1. Mandatory  contributions  based  on employee's  salary  include: Employee  2.5%, employer  5%, and the State 1.5%;  plus variable
contributions  to complementary  funds
Source: Cerda, L and Grandolini,  G., "Mexico:  The 1997  Pension  Reform," 1996;  World  Bank internal  document.39
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